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Abstract:	  What	  are	  emergencies	  and	  why	  do	   they	  matter?	   In	   this	   chapter	   (in	   its	  penultimate	  
version),	   I	   seek	   to	   outline	   the	  morally	   significant	   features	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   emergency,	   and	  
demonstrate	   how	   these	   features	   generate	   corresponding	   first-­‐	   and	   second-­‐order	   challenges	  
and	  responsibilities	  for	  those	  in	  a	  position	  to	  do	  something	  about	  them.	  In	  section	  A,	  I	  contend	  
that	   emergencies	   are	   situations	   in	  which	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   of	   serious	   harm	   and	   a	   need	   to	   react	  
urgently	  if	  that	  harm	  is	  to	  be	  averted	  or	  minimized.	  These	  conceptual	  features	  matter	  morally,	  
since	   it	   is	   precisely	   to	   them	   that	   those	   who	   invoke	   emergencies	   to	   justify	   otherwise	  
impermissible	   actions	   tend	   to	   appeal.	   The	   basic	   first-­‐order	   challenge	   facing	   emergency	  
responders	  is	  two-­‐fold.	  It	  is,	  first,	  to	  identify	  how	  these	  features	  shape	  circumstances	  of	  action	  
in	  ways	  that	  affect	  (or	  do	  not	  affect)	  which	  reasons	  for	  action	  and	  which	  corresponding	  courses	  
of	   conduct	   are	   justifiably	   available	   to	   them.	   In	   situations	   when	   emergency	   responders	   are	  
compelled	   to	   make	   authoritative	   determinations	   due	   to	   significant	   contestability	   and	  
indeterminacies	  in	  the	  contours	  or	  materialization	  of	  the	  said	  features,	  their	  challenge	  is	  then	  
also	   to	   make	   these	   determinations	   legitimately.	   In	   section	   B,	   I	   argue	   that	   second-­‐order	  
challenges	   having	   to	   do	   with	   the	   foreseeability	   of	   emergencies,	   the	   value(s)	   of	   exposure	   to	  
them,	  and	  their	  preventability	  further	  compound	  the	  predicament	  of	  emergency	  responders.	  I	  
conclude,	  in	  section	  C,	  by	  saying	  a	  few	  words	  about	  one	  last	  morally	  salient	  feature	  shared	  by	  
many,	  though	  not	  all,	  emergencies	  considered	  in	  the	  chapter—namely,	  their	  public	  dimension.	  
Key	  words:	  concept	  of	  emergency,	  public	  emergencies,	  needs,	  harm,	  urgency,	  risk,	  
foreseeability,	  preventability,	  indeterminacy,	  governance,	  state,	  authority,	  justification,	  excuse	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A.	  Setting	  the	  Stage	  and	  Two	  Sets	  of	  Basic	  Challenges	  
“Everyone’s	   troubles	  make	  a	   crisis,”	  writes	  Michael	  Walzer.	   “‘Emergency’	  and	   ‘crisis’	   are	   cant	  
words,	   used	   to	   prepare	   our	   minds	   for	   acts	   of	   brutality”	   (Walzer	   1977,	   251).	   In	   light	   of	  
provocative	  assertions	  of	   this	   sort,	  one	  cannot	  help	  but	  wonder:	   is	   ‘emergency’	   really	   such	  a	  
cant	  and	  malleable	  concept?	  History	  gives	  us	  numerous	  reasons	  to	  think	  it	  may	  be.	  How	  many	  
times	  in	  the	  last	  century	  alone	  have	  heads	  of	  state	  invoked	  looming	  or	  ongoing	  emergencies	  as	  
grounds	  for	  imposing	  harsh	  “emergency	  measures”	  on	  their	  populations?	  How	  frequently	  have	  
state-­‐governments	  sought	  to	  account	  for	  attacking,	  invading,	  or	  occupying	  foreign	  territories	  by	  
pointing	  to	  urgent	  threats	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  constituency	  or	  to	  those	  of	  others?1	  Indeed,	  
for	   some	   leading	   emergency	   theorists,	   it	   is	   the	  very	  manipulability	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   emergency	  
that	  accounts	   for	   its	  practical	   salience.	  According	   to	  Carl	   Schmitt,	   for	  example,	  while	   it	   is	  not	  
everyone’s	  troubles	  that	  make	  an	  emergency,	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  emergency	  is	  still	  contingent	  
on	  someone’s	  say-­‐so.	  It	  is	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  society’s	  “sovereign,”	  Schmitt	  famously	  writes,	  that	  he	  
decides	  whether	  there	   is	  an	  emergency	  as	  well	  as	  what	  must	  be	  done	  to	  eliminate	  it	  (Schmitt	  
2005,	  12).	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  want	  to	  dispute	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  emergencies	  and	  their	  moral	  
importance.	  I	  intend	  to	  do	  so,	  first,	  by	  outlining	  the	  specific	  features	  of	  the	  concept	  that	  I	  take	  
to	   be	   both	   definitive	   and	  morally	   significant	   and,	   second,	   demonstrating	   how	   these	   features	  
generate	   corresponding	   first-­‐	   and	   second-­‐order	   challenges	   and	   responsibilities	   for	   those	   in	   a	  
position	  to	  do	  something	  about	  them.	  To	  borrow	  language	  from	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights,2	  my	   focus	  will	   primarily	   be	   on	   “war”	   and	   “other	   public	   emergencies”	   and	   the	  
basic,	   emergency-­‐specific	   challenges	   they	   pose	   for	   those—notably,	   governments	   and	   their	  
agents—	  who	  strive	  to	  handle	  them	  appropriately,	  that	  is,	  in	  a	  morally	  justified	  way.	  I	  speak	  of	  
‘basic’	  challenges	  to	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  challenges	  with	  which	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  here	  are	  
not	   inherently	  public.	   In	  other	  words,	  except	   for	  some	  remarks	  made	   in	  conclusion,	  my	  focus	  
will	   not	   be	   on	   the	   public	   dimension	   of	   the	   emergencies	   in	   question	   and	   its	   distinctive	  moral	  
implications,	   but	   on	   their	   character	   as	   emergencies	   simpliciter	   and	   the	   challenges	   they	  may	  
pose	  as	  such.	  Thus,	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  argument	  will	  sometimes	  extend	  beyond	  cases	  of	  war,	  civil	  
conflicts,	   and	   the	   like,	   and	   so	  will	   some	   of	  my	   illustrations.	   Yet,	   I	   intend	   to	   concentrate	  my	  
attention	   on	   these	   emergencies	   in	   particular,	   since	   they	   typically	   feature	   additional	  
complexities	   of	   scale,	   which	   a	   focus	   on	   more	   discrete	   or	   individual	   emergencies	   would	   risk	  
eliding.	  Note	  also	  that,	  to	  reflect	  contemporary	  reality	  and	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity,	  I	  will	  tend	  
to	  assume	  that	  governments	  and	  their	  agents	  are	  those	  who	  are	  best	  placed	  to	  address	  these	  
emergencies	   appropriately.	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	   do	   not	  mean	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   other	  
(domestic	  or	   international)	  entities	  or	   individuals	  may	  sometimes	  be	   in	  as	  good	  a	  position,	  or	  
even	  be	  better	  placed,	  to	  address	  them.	  
1 Amongst the many existing studies, useful starting points include: Ramraj and Thiruvengadam (2010), Scheppele 
(2006), and Loveman (1993).  
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) s 15(1). 
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So	   it	   is	   untrue	   that	  whatever	   someone—sovereign	   or	   anyone	   else—declares	   to	   be	   an	  
emergency	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  emergency	  (accounting,	  of	  course,	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  anyone	  may,	  
through	  their	  behaviour,	  create	  emergencies	  for	  themselves	  and	  others).	  All,	  including	  those	  in	  
relevant	  positions	  of	  authority,	  can	  be	  wrong	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  emergencies.	  The	  concept	  
of	  emergency	  is	  a	  normative	  concept	  and	  has	  contours	  that	  impose	  at	  least	  some	  limits	  on	  what	  
situations	   can	   properly	   be	   described	   as	   such.	   Emergencies,	   I	   will	   contend,	   are	   situations	   in	  
which	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  serious	  harm	  and	  a	  need	  to	  react	  urgently	  if	  that	  harm	  is	  to	  be	  averted	  
or	  minimized.	  These	  features—i.e.	  urgency,	  the	  potential	  for	  serious	  harm,	  needed	  response	  for	  
harm	  avoidance	  or	  minimization—matter	  conceptually	  since	  not	  all	  situations	  encompass	  them,	  
or	   encompass	   them	   in	   the	   same	  way.	   Only	   emergencies	   do.	  When	   one	   of	   these	   features	   is	  
missing,	  an	  event	  is	  not	  an	  emergency.	  Thus,	  as	  I	  discuss	  at	  greater	  length	  later,	  a	  fast	  unfolding	  
risk	  of	  serious	  harm	  whose	  materialization	  cannot	  realistically	  be	  averted	  or	  minimized	  does	  not	  
constitute	  an	  emergency.	  If	  anything,	  it	  is	  a	  tragedy,	  a	  disaster.	  Consider	  also	  an	  urgent	  risk	  of	  a	  
mere	   inconvenience	  or	  trifling	  harm.	  Such	  risk	  can	  at	  best	  be	  metaphorically	  analogized	  to	  an	  
emergency.	  A	  fresh	  ketchup	  stain	  on	  my	  white	  shirt	  may	  be	  akin	  to	  an	  emergency	  in	  that	  I	  am	  
urgently	  required	  to	  soak	  it	  in	  water	  if	  I	  want	  to	  avoid	  it	  becoming	  indelible.	  All	  else	  being	  equal,	  
though,	  it	  is	  not	  really	  an	  emergency.	  
The	   identified	   features	   also	   matter	   morally,	   since	   those	   who	   invoke	   emergencies	   to	  
justify	   otherwise	   impermissible	   actions	   tend	   to	   appeal	   precisely	   to	   them	   in	   doing	   so.	   For	  
Schmitt,	  who	  assumes	  that	  the	  “sovereign”	  is	  only	  ever	  constrained	  in	  his	  actions	  by	  the	  limits	  
of	  his	  power	  and	  whatever	  social	  and	  political	   forces	  he	  deems	  prudent	  to	  take	   into	  account,	  
the	  moral	   importance	  of	   these	   features	   is	   largely	   irrelevant.3	   Yet,	  one	  would	  be	   ill-­‐advised	   to	  
follow	  him	  down	  this	  nihilistic	  path.	  Although	  an	  anarchist	  attitude	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  law	  and	  social	  
conventions	   is—irrespective	   of	   its	   rightness	   or	   wrongness—intelligible,	   amoralism	   is	   not.	  
Morality,	  as	  I	  understand	  it	  here,	  refers	  to	  the	  true,	  or	  valid,	  reasons	  that	  people	  have—reasons	  
that	  apply	  to	  whomever	  they	  address	  and	  whose	  scope	   is	  determined	  by	  their	  content.4	  Thus	  
understood,	  morality	  is	  often	  described	  as	  the	  art	  of	  life.	  In	  virtue	  of	  its	  very	  nature,	  it	  applies	  to	  
all	   agents	   capable	  of	  understanding	   it,	   irrespective	  of	   their	   interest	   in	   it,	  of	  who	   they	  are,	   of	  
what	   they	   feel	   about	   it,	   and	   of	   the	   predicaments	   in	  which	   they	   find	   themselves.	   Of	   course,	  
reasons	  for	  action	  that	  differ	  in	  strength	  or	  type	  from	  those	  ordinarily	  at	  play	  may	  sometimes	  
prevail	   in	   emergency	   situations.	   This	   is	   why	   some	   emergencies	   are	   thought	   to	   have	   special	  
moral	  salience	  and	  warrant	  certain	  departures	  from	  ‘normality.’	  In	  other	  words,	  morality	  is	  not	  
inflexible.	  What	  it	  demands	  and	  permits	  can	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  circumstances,	  such	  as	  in	  
3 Although Schmitt contends that his methodological ambitions are purely descriptive, many passages of his relevant 
work—such as his assertion that states have a right of self-preservation (Schmitt 2005, 12)—sit awkwardly with that 
contention.  
4On this broad account of morality, see e.g. Raz (2004, 2-3). 
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some	   emergency	   contexts.	   Therefore,	   morality	   does	   not	   simply	   cease	   to	   apply	   in	   such	  
situations.	  To	  put	  the	  point	  more	  concretely,	  if	  we	  take	  morality	  to	  be	  the	  true	  or	  valid	  reasons	  
that	   people	   have	   for	   acting,	   we	  may,	   in	   ordinary	   or	   non-­‐emergency	   contexts,	   be	   capable	   of	  
recognizing	   and	   codifying	   these	   reasons	   into	  moral	   precepts—such	   as,	  arguendo,	   the	  Golden	  
Rule,	  the	  categorical	  imperative,	  justice	  as	  fairness,	  respect	  for	  basic	  human	  rights,	  and	  the	  rule	  
of	   law.	   It	   can	   appear	   that	   emergencies	   are	   exactly	   those	   situations	   in	   which	   morality,	  
understood	  merely	  as	  those	  precepts,	  ceases	  to	  apply.	  However,	  while	  emergencies	  may	  well	  
depart	  from	  normality,	  morality—that	  is,	  true	  or	  valid	  reasons—is	  not	  also	  left	  behind.	  Different	  
reasons,	  or	  reasons	  of	  different	  force,	  may	  be	  at	  play	  in	  emergencies,	  but	  reasons	  nonetheless.5	  	  
Thus,	   one	   of	   the	   very	   real	   challenges	   of	   emergencies—such	   as	  wars	   or	   other	   violent	  
conflicts—for	   those	   who	   have	   to	   contend	   with	   them	   is	   to	   identify	   and	   assess	   their	   salient	  
features	   and	   craft	   responses	   that	   give	   them	   their	   due	   (some	   may	   prefer	   the	   term	  
‘proportionate’)	   moral	   importance,	   in	   light	   of	   all	   relevant	   circumstances,	   without	   going	  
overboard	  and	  abusing	  the	  label.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  following	  objection	  is	  somewhat	  predictable:	  
aren’t	  the	  features	  of	  emergencies	  listed	  above	  so	  vague	  that,	  in	  most	  situations,	  at	  least	  some	  
human	  determinations	  will	  be	  required	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  obtain	   in	   fact	  and	  are	  
morally	  salient?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  must	  admittedly	  be	  a	  qualified	  one.	  As	  I	  suggested,	  
the	  concept	  of	  emergency	  refers	  to	  needs	  for	  action	  (to	  be	  understood	  as	  including	  both	  acts	  
and	  omissions).	  More	  specifically,	  emergencies	  involve	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  need	  for	  action:	  a	  need	  
to	   act	   to	   avoid	   or	   minimize	   serious	   harm.	   The	   idea	   of	   need	   in	   question	   has	   some	   definite	  
objective	   contours.	   For	  example,	   soldiers	  who	   lie	  on	   the	  battlefield	   bleeding	   to	   death	  clearly	  
need	   emergency	   treatment.	   Their	   need	   is	   entrenched	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   treatment	   is	  
categorically	   necessary,	   in	   any	   realistic	   possible	   future	  we	   can	   devise,	   if	   they	   are	   to	   survive.	  
Some	  pressing	  needs	  are	  also	  non-­‐substitutable	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  nothing	  else	   than	  φ	  would	  
fulfil	   them	   as	   well	   or	   nearly	   as	   well—e.g.	   intake	   of	   some	   sufficiently	   hydrating	   substance	   is	  
necessary,	   in	   a	   non-­‐substitutable	  way,	   to	   avoid	   dehydration.6	   Then	   again,	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	  
claim	   that	   there	   are	   no	   alternatives	   to	   φ	   will	   sometimes,	   depending	   how	   specifically	   φ	   is	  
defined,	   be	   debatable.	   Likewise,	   what	   constitutes	   serious	   harm—which	   the	   concept	   of	  
emergency	  assumes	  we	  have	  a	  forceful	  reason	  to	  avoid—is	  itself	  somewhat	  indeterminate	  and,	  
thus,	  may	  at	  times	  be	  contestable.	  Some	  cases	  of	  serious	  harm	  are	  quite	  uncontroversial,	  and	  
5 I defend this claim in Tanguay-Renaud (2012, 30-36). It is true that certain doomsday scenarios threatening the 
annihilation of human civilization and the subversion of the very foundations of morality may challenge its 
applicability. The point is that these supreme moral emergencies are the rarest of the rare, the unlikely exception to 
the exception, and that it is clearly inadvisable to take them as paradigms for the understanding of the relationship 
between emergencies, morality, and appropriate responses. On this point, see further Tanguay-Renaud (2009, 47-
50). 
6 On categorical needs—elaborated in terms of the necessity to avoid serious harm and understood in contrast to 
mere instrumental needs—and the entrenched and non-substitutable character of many such needs, see Wiggins 
(1987, 1-57). Wiggins’s account of needs remains one of the most insightful to date, despite being lacking in nuance 
in some notable respects. For example, while he sometimes seems to assume that needs to avoid serious harm must, 
as a conceptual requirement, be morally compelling, we can easily think of cases where this is not the case. A moral 
monster like Hitler, afflicted by a fatal though easily curable disease, may well need treatment, while saving him is 
not a morally compelling goal. Something similar may also be said of the need to rescue the individual in poor 
health who, after careful and measured deliberation, has decided to end his life.  
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provide	  clear	  examples	  of	  the	  moral	  content	  of	  the	  concept.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  the	  person	  
being	   violently	   tortured	   to	   the	   point	   that	   she	   will	   undoubtedly	   be	   left	   in	   a	   permanent	  
vegetative	   state	   if	   no	   action	   is	   taken.	   Think	   also	   of	   cases	  where	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	   one	   thing	  
would	  be	  significantly	  more	  harmful	  than	  another—ceteris	  paribus,	  for	  the	  political	  institutions	  
of	  a	  decent	  state	  to	  collapse,	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  temporarily	  inhibited.	  At	  bottom,	  though,	  the	  
assessment	  of	  harm	  and	  its	  seriousness	  requires	  at	  least	  some	  judgment	  and,	  therefore,	  may	  on	  
occasion	  leave	  room	  for	  reasonable	  disagreement.	  If,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ordinary	  meaning,	  harm	  to	  
people	   is	   what	   makes	   them	   worse-­‐off	   than	   they	   were,	   or	   are	   entitled	   to	   be,	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
affects	  their	  future	  well-­‐being	  or	  flourishing,	  then	  we	  must	  appeal	  to	  a	  value-­‐based	  explanation	  
of	  what	  makes	  it	  so	  whenever	  we	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  harm.	  Detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  content	  of	  
that	   value-­‐based	   explanation	   may	   be	   disputable,	   leading,	   for	   example,	   to	   conflicting	   claims	  
about	   the	   harm	   potential	   of	   a	   particular	   emergency.	   Consider,	   for	   example,	   the	   various	  
plausible	  answers	  that	  could	  be	  given	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  harmful—as	  well	  as	  to	  whom,	  and	  
in	  what	  way(s)—the	  Taliban’s	  destruction	  of	  the	  Buddhas	  of	  Bamian	  actually	  was.	  
	  
The	  existence	  of	  such	  areas	  of	  contestability	  may	  lead	  some	  to	  think	  that	  responses	  to	  
given	  events	  should	  only	  be	  treated	  as	  responses	  to	  emergencies	  when	  the	  urgent	  necessity	  of	  
these	  responses,	  and	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  harm	  they	  seek	  to	  avoid,	  are	  unambiguous.	  There	  is	  
perhaps	  a	  grain	  of	  truth	  in	  this	  thought,	  to	  which	  I	  will	  eventually	  return	   in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  
the	  chapter.	  At	  this	  stage,	  however,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  emergencies	  will	  also	  exist	  in	  
situations	  where	   it	   is	   debatable	   how	   serious	   the	   harm	   at	   issue	   really	   is	   and	  whether	   a	   given	  
response	   is	   strictly	  necessary	   to	  avert	   it.	   In	   such	   situations,	  authoritative	  determinations	  may	  
have	   to	   be	   made	   by	   those	   who	   are	   in	   a	   position	   to	   make	   them.	   Yet,	   pace	   Schmitt,	   such	  
determinations	  must	  themselves	  be	  justified	  since,	  like	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  human	  conduct,	  they	  
are	  themselves	  subject	  to	  moral	  appraisal.	  Here,	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  revisit	  the	  deep	  and	  extensive	  
literature	  on	  what	  makes	  exercises	  of	  practical	  authority	  justified,	  inside	  or	  outside	  the	  political	  
context.7	   Suffice	   it	   to	   say	   that	  whatever	   the	  correct	  ground(s)	   for	   their	   justification—be	   they	  
voluntarist	  or	  non-­‐voluntarist—authorities	  cannot	  escape	  evaluation	  in	  such	  terms.	  	  
	  
Thus,	   the	   basic	   challenge	   facing	   authorities	   in	   emergencies	   is	   two-­‐fold.	   It	   is,	   first,	   to	  
identify	  how	  emergencies	  shape	  (or	  do	  not	  shape)	  circumstances	  of	  action	  in	  ways	  that	  affect	  
which	  reasons	  for	  action	  and	  which	  corresponding	  course(s)	  of	  conduct	  are	  justifiably	  available,	  
in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  being	  morally	  defeated	  by	  other,	  more	  compelling	  ones.	  For	  example,	  does	  
the	  fact	  that	  a	  rogue	   regime	  possesses	  a	   few	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  and	  threatens	  to	  
use	  them	  unjustly,	  justify	  a	  defensive	  yet	  pre-­‐emptive	  military	  campaign,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  trade	  
embargo	   or	   other	   such	   robust	   diplomatic	   manoeuvres?	   Insofar	   as	   it	   does	   justify	   a	   military	  
campaign,	  what	  kind	  of	  campaign,	  given,	   inter	  alia,	  the	  number	  of	  innocent	  civilians	  who	  may	  
be	  killed	  in	  the	  process?	  Does	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  country	  transitioning	  out	  of	  a	  bloody	  civil	  war	  is	  on	  
                                                
7 For a remarkably succinct and cogent survey of the theoretical literature on the question of legitimate practical 
authority, see generally Green (2010).  
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the	  brink	  of	  reverting	  to	  that	  state	  justify	  targeted	  killings	  of	  agitators	  or,	  say,	  their	  exemplary	  
and	  retroactive	  punishment	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law?	  The	  second	  basic	  challenge	  is	  that,	  
when	   authoritative	   determinations	   are	   required	   due	   to	   significant	   indeterminacies	   and	  
contestability,	   those	   who	   make	   them	   must	   ensure	   that	   their	   exercises	   of	   authority	   are	  
themselves	   justified.	   Depending	   on	   one’s	   theory	   of	   legitimate	   authority,	   one	   may	   ask,	   for	  
example,	  whether	  such	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  better	  placed	  than	  others	  to	  assess	  that	  a	  military	  
campaign	  or	   targeted	  killings	  would	  be	   just,	  necessary,	  and	  proportionate.	  On	  might	  also	  ask	  
whether,	   in	   the	   circumstances,	   they	   have	   been	   appropriately	   authorized	   by	   those	   in	   whose	  
names	  they	  purport	  to	  make	  decisions.	  Of	  course,	  while	  all	  emergency-­‐related	  determinations	  
have	  to	  be	  morally	  justified,	  not	  all	  of	  them	  have	  to	  be	  justified	  qua	  exercises	  of	  authority.	  This	  
is	   because,	   conceptually	   speaking,	   authority	   is	   exercised	   over	   others,	   as	   a	  means	   of	   altering	  
their	   normative	   position.8	   It	   is	  my	   focus	   on	   governmental	   responses	   to	   emergencies—which	  
characteristically	   involve	   authoritative	   determinations—that	   leads	   me	   to	   emphasize	   this	  
additional,	  yet	  important,	  layer	  of	  complexity.	  
At	   this	   juncture,	   one	  may	   rightly	   point	   out	   that	   an	   inquiry	   into	   the	  moral	   salience	   of	  
emergencies	   that	   restricted	   its	   focus	   to	   the	   need	   to	   avoid	   serious	   harm	  would	   overlook	   one	  
crucial	   feature.	   Emergencies	   are	   not	   only	   important	   but	   also	   urgent	   needs.	   Assuming	   that	  
serious	   harm	  would	   ensue	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   certain	   reaction,	   an	   emergency’s	   urgency	   is	   a	  
function	  of	  how	  rapidly	  this	  reaction	  must	  occur.	  Urgency	  and	  harm	  operate	  on	  different	  axes	  
of	   salience.	  While	   these	   axes	  may	   coalesce	   in	   the	  most	   exigent	   emergencies,	   they	  may	   also	  
diverge.	   	  Meeting	  a	  need	  may	  be	  urgent,	  but	  a	  matter	  of	  moderately	  harmful	   consequences.	  
Conversely,	   a	   need	   may	   be	   a	   matter	   of	   little	   urgency,	   yet	   be	   otherwise	   very	   important,	   as	  
measured	   by	   the	   amount	   of	   harm	   that	   would	   be	   occasioned	   if	   it	   were	   not	   met.	   Assuming,	  
though,	  that	  we	  hold	  the	  harm	  variable	  constant,	  it	  becomes	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  various	  needs	  to	  
avoid	   harm	  may	   be	   assessed	   in	   terms	   of	  what	   Thomas	   Scanlon	   calls	   a	   “hierarchy	   of	   relative	  
urgency”	  (Scanlon	  1975,	  660-­‐661).	  	  Of	  course,	  in	  some	  large-­‐scale	  scenarios—such	  as	  wars,	  civil	  
conflicts,	   and	   the	   like—emergency	   responders	   may	   simultaneously	   be	   confronted	   to	   many	  
perils	   with	   differing	   levels	   of	   harm	   potential.	   In	   such	   cases,	   further	   variations	   on	   the	   axis	   of	  
urgency	   can	   generate	   exceedingly	   complex	   moral	   dilemmas.	   Accordingly,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
always	  bear	   in	  mind	  the	  compounding	  effect	  of	   these	  two	  types	  of	  variations	  when	  assessing	  
the	  overall	  challenges	  posed	  by	  large-­‐scale,	  multifaceted	  emergencies	  such	  as	  international	  or	  
civil	  wars.	  For	  the	  moment,	  however,	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  assume	  the	  simpler	  picture	  for	  the	  sake	  
of	  clarity.	  	  
The	   concept	   of	   emergency	   implies	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   urgency,	   i.e.	   immediacy	   or	   near	  
immediacy.	  This	  feature	  tends	  to	  limit	  the	  opportunities	  that	  emergency	  responders	  have	  to	  act	  
if	   they	   are	   to	   avert	   harm.	   In	   other	   words,	   urgency	   tends	   to	   make	   some	   reactions	   less	  
substitutable—or,	   so	   to	   speak,	  more	  necessary—for	   the	  purpose	   of	  harm	  avoidance.	  Therein	  
lies	  the	  specific	  moral	  salience	  of	  the	  urgency	  dimension:	  urgency	  may	  make	  some	  courses	  of	  
conduct	  related	  to	  harm	  avoidance	  more	  rationally	  eligible	  than	  they	  would	  otherwise	  be.	  Thus,	  
8 On this point, see Gardner (2010, 83-89). 
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even	   if,	   ideally,	   it	   would	   be	   better	   for	   a	   government	   to	   take	   the	   path	   of	   diplomacy	   and	  
multilateralism	   in	   lieu	   of	   attacking	   another	   state	   in	   self-­‐defense,	   it	   may	   not	   have	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   do	   so	   if	   it	   faces	   an	   ongoing	   neo-­‐colonial	   invasion.	   When	   serious	   harm	   is	  
threatened	  and	   there	   is	  no	   time	   to	  engage	   in	  otherwise-­‐favourable	   courses	  of	  action,	   it	  may	  
become	  justifiable	  to	  take	  less	  ideal	  paths.	  	  
	  
Urgency	  as	  a	  moral	  feature	  also	  has	  its	  loose-­‐ends.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  emergencies	  are	  
so	  urgent	  that,	  when	  faced	  with	  them,	  one	  should	  not	  ask	  oneself	  what	  to	  do,	  but	  react	  to	  the	  
situation	   as	   one	   sees	   it.	  Otherwise,	   both	   thought	   and	   action	  may	   simply	   come	   too	   little,	   too	  
late.	  Think,	   for	  example,	  of	  a	  soldier	  who	   jumps	  swiftly	  out	  of	  the	  way	  of	  a	  bullet	  shot	   in	  her	  
direction.	   Yet,	  most	   emergencies	   are	   not	   so	   urgent	   as	   to	   preclude	   all	   deliberation.	  While	   in	  
some	   cases,	   deliberation,	   although	   possible,	   only	   amplifies	   the	   emergency—think	   of	   endless	  
deliberations	   about	   how	   best	   to	   address	   ongoing	   global	   warming—in	   many	   others,	   a	  
necessarily	  limited	  amount	  of	  deliberation	  is	  critical	  to	  an	  appropriate	  response.9	  Consider	  the	  
case	  of	   the	  military	   surgeon	  who	   (to	   some	  extent	  at	   least)	  must	  weigh	  pros	  and	  cons	  before	  
proceeding	   to	   an	   emergency	   surgery,	   or	   the	   squad	   leader	   who	   ought	   to	   assess	   (at	   least	  
minimally)	   risks	   to	   her	   soldiers	   as	   well	   as	   chances	   of	   success	   before	   launching	   a	   rescue	  
operation	  of	  an	  endangered	  captured	  squad	  member.	  Before	  attacking	  other	  territories	  in	  self-­‐
defense	   and	   risking	   the	   killing	   of	   innocents,	   one	   would	   also	   hope	   that	   state-­‐governments	  
deliberate	  at	   least	  minimally.	  With	  a	   traditional	   separation	  of	  powers	  model,	   a	   full	   legislative	  
debate	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  given	  time	  constraints.	  The	  executive	  branch	  of	  government	  might	  
be	   the	  only	  organ	   in	  a	  position	   to	  devise	  and	   implement	  a	  quick	  enough	   response.	  Yet	   some	  
deliberation	   still	   ought	   to	   take	   place.	   Thus,	   in	   all	   these	   cases,	   an	   important	   question	   for	  
emergency	  responders	  will	  no	  doubt	  be	  how	  urgent	  the	  emergency	  really	   is.	  And	  here	  again,	  
when	   the	   degree	   of	   urgency	   is	   significantly	   unclear,	   authoritative	   determinations	   may	   be	  
needed.	  However,	  this	  additional	  level	  of	  complexity	  must	  not	  detract	  us	  from	  the	  basic	  moral	  
salience	  that	  an	  urgency-­‐constrained	  set	  of	  opportunities	  for	  the	  avoidance	  of	  serious	  harm	  will	  
often	  have	  in	  fact.	  	  
	  
B	   SECOND-­ORDER	  BASIC	  EMERGENCY	  CHALLENGES	  
	  
1	   Emergencies,	  Foreseeability,	  and	  the	  Importance	  of	  Prevention	  
	  
The	  account	  just	  given	  of	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  emergencies,	  and	  the	  challenge	  of	  assessing	  
it	   correctly,	   may	   seem	   intuitively	   accurate—at	   least	   when	   considered	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
emergencies	  that	  could	  not	  reasonably	  be	  expected.	  In	  such	  situations,	  one	  typically	  needs	  to	  
take	  action	  swiftly	  while	  the	  stakes	  are	  high.	  Available	  opportunities	  for	  thought	  and	  action	  are	  
fixed	  by	  immediate	  circumstances,	  and	  emergency	  responders	  have	  no	  relevant	  influence	  over	  
them	  given	  the	  suddenness	  of	  the	  situation.	  They	  are	  often	  confronted	  to	  the	  emergency	  due	  
                                                
9 This point is eloquently articulated in Scarry (2011). 
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to	  no	  unreasonableness	  of	  their	  own,	  and	  are	  constrained	  to	  act	  on	  reasons	  as	  they	  encounter	  
them	  at	  the	  time.	  But	  what	  about	  emergencies	  that	  are	  intentionally	  provoked	  or	  are	  somehow	  
predictable,	   and	   whose	   occurrence	   may	   have	   been	   avoided,	   or	   characteristics	   mitigated,	   by	  
preventive	   measures	   or	   altogether	   different	   choices	   of	   prior	   conduct?	   Confronting	   an	  
emergency	  may	  be	  an	  urgent	  necessity	  at	  time	  t2,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  impossible	  to	  evade,	  but	  
what	  if	  one	  could	  have	  ensured	  at	  antecedent	  time	  t1	  that	  the	  emergency	  would	  not	  occur,	  or	  
would	  occur	  in	  a	  mitigated	  form?	  Although	  they	  have	  no	  direct	  bearing	  on	  what	  constitutes	  an	  
emergency	   from	   a	   conceptual	   standpoint,	   such	   challenging	   questions	   seem	   to	   speak	   to	   the	  
moral	   salience	   of	   emergencies.	   In	   fact,	   some	   theorists	   even	   assume	   that	   the	   only	   genuinely	  
significant	  emergencies	  are	  those	  “such	  that	  people	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  plan	  to	  be	  in	  that	  kind	  of	  
situation”	  (Gert	  2004,	  72-­‐73).10	  What	  should	  one	  make	  of	  such	  assertions?	  
	  
Early	  deliberations,	  advanced	   planning,	  and	  anticipatory	  decisions	  are	   central	   features	  
of	   rational	  activity.	  However,	   to	  be	  able	  to	  plan	  ahead	  appropriately	  and	  behave	  accordingly,	  
one	  must	  often	  have	  some	   idea	  of	   the	  circumstances	   for	  which	   to	  plan.	   It	  might	  be	  objected	  
that	   one	   can	   always	   insure	   or	   save	   money	   so	   as	   to	   be	   better	   able	   to	   deal	   with	   whatever	  
situation	  may	  arise,	  without	  knowing	  anything	  about	   it	   in	  advance.	  However,	   the	   strength	  of	  
this	   objection	   is	   relatively	   limited	   with	   regard	   to	   emergencies.	   There	   are	   many	   cases	   of	  
emergencies	  in	  which	  no	  amount	  of	  money	  could	  make	  up	  for	  the	  serious	  harm	  incurred	  due	  to	  
lack	  of	  planning	  and	  preparation—e.g.	  (from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  an	  individual)	  violated	  sexuality	  
and	  associated	  psychological	  trauma,	  ruined	  reputation,	  unremediable	  physical	  handicap,	  death	  
or	  (from	  a	  more	  collective	  perspective	  such	  as	  that	  of	  a	  state)	  collapsed	  institutions	  and	  mass	  
casualties.	   Furthermore,	   the	   fact	   that	  money	   could	   have	   been	   saved	   or	   insurance	   bought	   in	  
anticipation	   of	   any	   possible	   emergency	   does	   not	   itself	   entail	   that	   these	   precautions	   are	   the	  
most	  reasonable	  or	  morally	  appropriate,	  compared	  to	  others.	  Foreseeability	  matters	  because	  it	  
tends	  to	  affect	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  respond	  to	  emergencies	  by	  shaping	  our	  opportunities	  
to	  prepare	  for	  them	  appropriately	  or	  avert	  them	  altogether.	  
	  
As	  I	  suggested	  earlier,	  the	  idea	  of	  emergency	  implies	  a	  lack	  of	  real	  alternatives	  if	  serious	  
harm	  is	  to	  be	  avoided.	  It	  implies	  necessity	  or,	  in	  Harry	  Frankfurt’s	  words,	  “something	  that	  [one]	  
cannot	  help	  needing”	  (Frankfurt	  1984,	  6).	  In	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  could	  have	  planned	  ahead,	  but	  
in	   which	   one	   did	   not	   want	   or	   care	   to	   plan,	   it	   seems	   more	   problematic	   than	   in	   reasonably	  
unexpected	  cases	  to	  characterize	  the	  situation	  as	  one	  in	  which	  there	  were	  no	  alternatives,	  no	  
opportunity	   to	   “help	   needing.”	   Although	   such	   characterization	   might	   be	   possible	   at	   time	   t2	  
immediately	   preceding	   the	   emergency,	   if	   it	  was	  not	   at	   earlier	   time	   t1	   or	   t0,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
predicament	  was	  somewhat	  foreseeable	  may	  give	  a	  related	  claim	  of	  emergency	  an	  aura	  of	  bad	  
faith.	  The	  necessity	  of	  harm	  avoidance	  at	  time	  t2,	  although	  indisputable,	  may	  be	  felt	  to	  be,	  as	  it	  
were,	  less	  genuine	  or	  less	  authentic.	  One	  way	  of	  articulating	  this	  thought	  in	  rational	  terms	  is	  to	  
note	  that	  in	  some	  situations	  the	  first-­‐order	  reasons	  supplied	  by	  an	  emergency—linked	  primarily	  
to	   its	   urgency	   and	   gravity—may	   be	   excluded,	   either	   fully	   or	   partially,	   by	   second-­‐order	  
                                                
10 Note that Gert recognizes that emergencies that are unlikely to be foreseen are only a “kind of emergency 
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considerations	  related	  to	  the	  emergency’s	  foreseeability.	  Commentators	  sometimes	  seek	  to	  put	  
this	  point	  across	  by	  arguing	  that	  those	  who	  embark	  on	  a	  course	  of	  action	  that	  foreseeably	  leads	  
them	   to	   confront	   a	   preventable	   emergency	   implicitly	   consent	   to,	   or	   assume,	   inherent	   risks.	  
Others	   speak	   of	   forfeiture,	   either	   full	   or	   partial,	   of	   the	   ability	   to	   invoke	   the	   emergency	   as	   a	  
justification	  for	  otherwise	  impermissible	  behaviour.	  	  
	  
This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   foreseeability	   always	   changes	   emergency	   responders’	   moral	  
position	   in	   this	  way.	   Surely,	  emergency	   responders	  ought	  not	  anticipate	  and	   seek	   to	  prevent	  
every	  single	  emergency	  that	  could	  conceivably	  be	  foreseen.	   If	  this	  were	  the	  salient	  threshold,	  
all	   circumstances	   in	  which	  what	   I	   have	   termed	   ‘unexpected	   emergencies’	   could	   arise	  would	  
have	  to	  be	  pre-­‐emptively	  managed	  or	  averted,	  leading	  to	  a	  constant	  worry	  that	  everything	  that	  
goes	  up	  may	  one	  day	  come	  down	  and	  generate	  an	  emergency!	  Regress	  in	  foreseeability	  would	  
be	  infinite	  and	  make	  life	  and	  attempts	  at	  societal	  governance	  very	  daunting	  indeed.	  Therefore,	  
to	  understand	   the	   relevance	  of	   foreseeability	   to	   the	  moral	   salience	  of	  emergencies,	  we	  must	  
consider	  when	  the	  first-­‐order	  reasons	  supplied	  by	  these	  emergencies—that	  is,	  the	  urgent	  needs	  
to	   avert	   or	   mitigate	   serious	   harms—may	   lose	   some	   of	   their	   rational	   standing	   due	   to	  
foreseeability-­‐related	  concerns.	   In	   the	   following	   sections,	   I	   consider	   some	  key	   issues	   that	  are	  
either	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  relevant	  to	  such	  a	  challenging	  and	  crucial	  assessment.	  
	  
2	   When	  Emergency	  Prevention	  Matters	  
	  
The	  answer	  to	  the	  general	  second-­‐order	  puzzle	  about	  emergency	  prevention	  introduced	  in	  the	  
last	   section	   depends,	   I	   think,	   on	   a	   multivariable	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   evaluation	   of:	   the	   risk	   of	  
emergency—that	   is,	   the	   probability	   that	   serious	   harm	   will	   urgently	   need	   to	   be	   avoided	   or	  
minimized,	   and	   its	   discoverability;	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	   harm	   at	   risk;	   the	   value	   of	   the	   course	   of	  
action	  that	  would	  expose	  agents	  to	  the	  emergency;	  and	  the	  burdens	  and	  costs	  associated	  with	  
emergency	  prevention	  or	  avoidance.	  As	  a	  rule	  of	  thumb,	  the	  higher	  the	  risk	  of	  emergency,	  the	  
more	  serious	  the	  harm	  at	  risk,	  the	  lower	  the	  value	  of	  the	  course	  of	  action	  leading	  to	  exposure,	  
and	  the	  lighter	  the	  burden	  of	  emergency	  prevention,	  the	  more	  one	  ought	  to	  seek	  to	  pre-­‐empt,	  
avoid,	  or	  minimize	  an	  emergency	  (and	  vice-­‐versa).	  Thus,	  the	  significance	  of	  foreseeability	  may	  
be	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.	  I	  have	  already	  spoken	  about	  the	  question	  of	  harm,	  but	  more	  must	  now	  
be	  said	  about	  the	  other	  variables	  just	  introduced,	  as	  well	  as	  about	  their	  interrelations.	  I	  discuss	  
them	  in	  turn.	  
	  
(a)	   Risk	  and	  risk	  assessment	  
	  
That	  the	  notion	  of	  risk	  is	  intrinsically	  connected	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  emergency	  should	  come	  as	  no	  
surprise.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  serious	  harm	  that	  a	  need	  to	  react	  urgently	  to	  avert	  or	  
minimize	   its	  materialization	  can	  arise.	  The	   risk	  of	  harm	  primarily	  at	   issue	   is	   the	  actual	   risk	  of	  
harm	   in	   the	   physical	   world,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   epistemic	   risk	   as	   it	   may	   be	   estimated	   by	  
emergency	   responders.	   This	   is	   because	   they	   are	   susceptible	   to	   making	   mistakes	   as	   well	   as	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neglecting	  probabilities,	  and	  morally	  significant	  risks	  are	  facts	  that	  exist	  irrespective	  of	  neglect	  
and	  mistakes.	  For	  example,	   in	  emergency	  settings,	   ignorance	  of	  relevant	   facts,	  unaccustomed	  
thinking,	  and	  emotions	  like	  fear	  may	  cause	  rational	  judgment	  to	  go	  awry.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  
emotions	  cannot	  be	  rationally	  helpful	   in	  emergencies,	   like	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  soldier	  driven	  by	  
raw	  fear	  to	   jump	  out	  of	  the	  path	  of	  a	  rocket	   fired	   in	  his	  direction.	   I	  am	  also	  not	  denying	  that	  
moral	  agents	  may	  be	  trained	  to	  assess	  and	  handle	  risks	  better,	  or	  that	  epistemic	  aids	  such	  as	  
safety	   standards	  may	   be	   fixed	  ex	  ante.	   However,	   even	  with	   all	   the	   precautions	   in	   the	  world,	  
errors	   in	   judgment	  may	   still	   happen:	  excusable	   errors	   that	  do	  not	  ultimately	   reflect	  badly	  on	  
their	  makers	  perhaps,	  but	  errors	  nonetheless.	  
	  
	   Here,	  one	  should	  not	  make	  the	  mistake	  of	  discounting	  too	  readily	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
knowableness,	   or	   discoverability,	   of	   a	   risk,	   and	   the	   challenges	   it	   may	   pose	   to	   potential	  
emergency	   responders.	   Indeed,	   it	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   think	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   weigh	   for	   or	  
against	  prevention,	  risks	  must	  be	  epistemically	  available	  as	  grounds	  for	  action.	  This	  conclusion	  
seems	  to	  flow	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  agent	  cannot	  take	  steps	  to	  avoid	  harm	  unless	  he	  or	  she	  is	  
able	  to	  foresee	  it,	  based	  on	  the	  evidence	  available.	  Of	  course,	  even	  for	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  know	  
a	  risk,	  knowledge	  may	  be	  elusive	  for	  reasons	  such	  as	   lack	  of	  resources,	  concealment	  (think	  of	  
military	   strategy),	   scientific	   uncertainty	   (think	   of	   complex	   risks	   of	   pandemics),	   or	   absence	   of	  
time	  between	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  risk	  and	  its	  materialisation.	  However,	  even	  if	  a	  risk	  is	  not	  fully	  
cognizable,	   it	  must	   at	   least	   partially	   be	   in	   order	   to	   be	   capable	   of	   grounding	   avoiding	   action.	  
Knowableness	  seems	  to	  matter	  to	  a	  risk’s	  moral	  significance,	  and	  this	  means	  that	  even	  partial	  
knowableness	  might	  sometimes	  affect	   it	   (or,	  at	   least,	  affect	  our	  evaluation	  of	  what	  responses	  
are	  morally	  acceptable	  in	  the	  circumstances).11	  
	  
Another	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  risk	  problématique	  that	  has	  captured	  the	  attention	  of	  
emergency	  theorists	  is	  its	  temporal	  scope.	  Just	  as	  the	  risks	  of	  emergencies	  may	  be	  ephemeral,	  
they	   may	   also	   persist	   over	   time.	   Some	   speak	   of	   long	   or	   chronic	   emergencies,	   even	   of	  
permanent	  ones.12	  There	  is	  some	  truth	  to	  such	  accounts,	  but	  various	  qualifications	  are	  in	  order.	  
Let	  us	  consider	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  what	  could	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ‘prolonged	  emergency’:	  
a	  protracted	  all-­‐out	  war.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  state,	  the	  risk	  of	  harm	  may	  be	  continuously	  
high,	   calling	   for	   relentlessly	   urgent	   planning	   and	   vigilance.	   The	   same	  might	   be	   said	   from	   the	  
point	  of	  view	  of	  soldiers	  and	  civilians	  in	  or	  near	  combat	  zones.	  However,	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  
the	   general	   risk	   of	   harm,	   the	   emphasis	   could	   also	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   multiple	   risks	   of	  
emergencies	   that	   constitute	   the	   so-­‐called	   prolonged	   emergency.	   If,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  
soldiers	  and	  civilians,	  their	  life	  is	  constantly	  at	  risk,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  because	  of	  a	  succession	  of	  
more	  discrete	  emergencies	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ground	  attacks,	  air	  raids,	  and	  so	  forth.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
                                                
11 In fact, as Victor Tadros (2011, 217-240) points out, evidence-relative risks, as opposed to genuine fact-relative or 
merely belief-relative risks, may sometimes play an even more morally significant role than this account allows.  
  
12 Cf. Rubenstein (2007) on chronic challenges linked to underdevelopment and lack of access to basic resources in 
some parts of the world. Another oft-cited example is the so-called ever present threat of terrorism. Given the 
pervasive nature of the phenomenon (however defined), it is often argued that the fight against it is urgent, although 
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states,	  combined	  attacks	  may	  heighten	  the	  risk	  of	  harm,	  but	  a	  war	   in	  the	  traditional,	  perhaps	  
non-­‐nuclear,	  sense	  is	  also	  constituted	  by	  successive	  campaigns,	  missions,	  and	  offensives,	  each	  
of	  which	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  probable,	  urgent,	  and	  harmful	  to	  the	  recipient.	  Therefore,	  all-­‐out	  
wars	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	   ‘states	  of	  emergency’	   for	  both	   individuals	  and	  states—in	  the	  sense	  of	  
periods	   in	   which	   the	   occurrence	   of	   many	   specific	   and	   successive	   emergencies	   is	   highly	  
probable.	  This	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  prolonged	  emergencies	  permits	  the	  breaking	  up	  of	  overall	  
risks	   into	   manageable	   units	   that	   rational	   agents	   may	   seek	   to	   address	   based	   on	   each	   unit’s	  
distinctive	   characteristics.	   This	   approach	   also	   accounts	   for	   the	   possibility	   that	   some	  
emergencies	   may	   lead	   to	   further	   emergencies,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   causally	   increasing	   their	  
probability.	  For	  example,	  a	  series	  of	  attempted	  political	  killings	  may	  set	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  motion.	  	  
	  
Such	   thinking	   about	   wars,	   civil	   conflicts,	   and	   other	   so-­‐called	   prolonged	   emergencies	  
presents	  them	  as	  situations	  that	  are	  significantly	  more	  morally	  complex	  than	  many	  of	  the	  moral	  
and	  political	  theorists	  who	  write	  about	  them	  sometimes	  assume.13	  This	  complexity	  should	  not	  
be	   avoided.	   Understanding	   the	   plethora	   of	   discrete	   moral	   dilemmas	   with	   which	   prolonged	  
emergencies	  are	  typically	  rife	  is	  essential	  to	  making	  complete	  sense	  of	  them,	  and	  the	  challenges	  
they	  pose.	  Different	   individuated	  emergencies,	  with	  different	  urgency	  and	  harm	  components,	  
may	   justify	  different	   individuated	  responses	  than	  those	  for	  which	  the	  overall	  character	  of	  the	  
war	   is	   otherwise	   thought	   to	   account.	   Of	   course,	   the	   converse	   is	   also	   possible.	   Various	  
individuated	  risks	  will	  sometimes	  conflict	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  certain	  emergency	  responses—that	  
would	   be	   justified	   if	   taken	   on	   their	   own—unjustified,	   all	   things	   considered.	   Indeed,	  
emergencies	  will	  sometimes	  conflict	  with	  each	  other.	  With	  such	  assessments,	  the	  devil	  tends	  to	  
be	   in	   the	   details,	   and	   we	  must	   not	   shy	   away	   from	   addressing	   these	   details,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
compounded	  complexities	  they	  entail	  for	  emergency	  prevention.	  The	  flipside	  of	  this	  argument	  
is	   that	   situations	   involving	   long-­‐term	   risks	   that,	   from	   the	   relevant	   standpoints,	   are	   devoid	   of	  
such	  discrete	  and	  successive	  urgent	  moments	  should	  likely	  not	  bear	  the	  label	  ‘emergency’	  at	  all.	  
As	   one	   social	   commentator	   notes	   in	   respect	   of	   such	   situations:	   “How	   long	   might	   the	   Long	  
Emergency	   last?	   A	   generation?	   Ten	   generations?	   A	   millennium?	   Ten	   millennia?	   Take	   your	  
choice.	   Of	   course,	   after	   a	   while,	   an	   emergency	   becomes	   the	   norm	   and	   is	   no	   longer	   an	  
emergency”	  (Kunstler	  2005,	  8).14	  	  
                                                
13 More recent engagements with just war theory, such as McMahan (2009), go some way towards remedying this 
methodological defect by focusing on the responsibility of various individual players in wars. Yet, the background 
unit of evaluation tends to remain whether one is fighting in a just or unjust war, as opposed to more discrete 
campaigns or missions. 
 
14 A similar type of criticism could be directed at states such as Brunei Darussalam, Swaziland, Israel, Egypt and 
Syria that claimed for many decades—and in many cases still claim—to be facing perpetual emergencies justifying 
resort to harsh ‘emergency powers’ to control their populations.  See e.g. Reza (2007). The further point to be made, 
of course, is that unjust regimes treating insurgent movements as emergency threats to their subsistence generally 
fail to acknowledge that they themselves—qua unjust regimes—can generate prolonged emergencies that may, or 
should, be resisted (given their more harmful character overall). No doubt, the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings of 2011 
against oppressive dictatorships ruling through ‘emergency measures’ were a sobering reminder of this possibility. 
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Is	  this	  account	  of	  prolonged	  emergencies	  too	  cut	  and	  dry?	  What	  about	  enduring	  second-­‐
order	   risks	  of	   first-­‐order	  risks	  of	  emergencies?	  Here,	   I	  am	  referring	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  meta-­‐
emergencies,	  at	  times	  also	  dubbed	  states	  of	  emergency,	  about	  the	  incidence	  of	  emergencies—
that	  is,	  emergencies	  that	  might	  be	  grounded	  in	  second-­‐order	  risks	  that	  currently	  unknown	  and	  
unascertainable	  first-­‐order	  risks	  of	  emergencies	  may	  come	  into	  being	  (or	  secretly	  already	  are).	  
The	  portrait	  of	  protracted	  warfare	  that	  I	  painted	  earlier	  assumed	  the	  existence	  of	  more	  or	  less	  
ascertainable	   first-­‐order	   risks	   that	   could	   be	   addressed	   at	   face	   value.	   Although	   it	   is	   true	   that	  
some	  risks	  may	  be	  ascertainable	  in	  this	  way,	  it	   is	  the	  nature	  of	  war	  that	  not	  all	  will	  be.	  Part	  of	  
the	   art	   of	   warfare	   are	   tactics	   like	   strategising	   in	   secret,	   coming	   up	   with	   unprecedented	  
manoeuvres,	   taking	   one’s	   enemy	   by	   surprise,	   demoralising	   it	   through	   shock	   and	   awe,	   and	  
infiltrating	   it	  on	  all	   conceivable	   fronts.	   Sometimes,	  all	   that	   is	   known	   (and	  knowable)	   from	  an	  
attacked	  party’s	  perspective	  are	  the	  generic	  types	  of	  risks	  that	  could	  possibly	  arise	  in	  times	  of	  
war,	  such	  as	  food	  shortages,	  civil	  disorder,	  treason,	  bombings,	  and	  so	  forth.	  It	  may	  be	  uncertain	  
whether	  these	  or	  other	  potential	  threats	  will	  ever	  come	  into	  being	  and,	  in	  the	  eventuality	  that	  
they	  do	  (or	  already	  secretly	  are),	   it	  might	  be	   impossible	  to	  anticipate	  where,	  when,	  and	  how.	  
Yet,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  if	  preventive	  action	  were	  not	  taken	  immediately,	  it	  would	  be	  
too	  late	  to	  react	   if	  and	  when	  those	  threats	  materialize.	  Therefore,	  to	  avert	  or	  minimize	  harm,	  
states	  may	  need	  to	  make	  decisive	  and	  immediate	  provisions	  for	  such	  uncertain	  possibilities,	  as	  
rough	   and	   approximate	   as	   these	   provisions	   may	   be,	   given	   the	   information	   at	   hand.15	  
Governments	  may	  need	  to	  impose	  rules	  seeking	  to	  tie	  up	  possible	  loose-­‐ends	  while	  there	  is	  still	  
time,	  and	  instruct	  immediate	  preventive	  food	  rationing,	  tighter	  checks	  on	  people	  with	  access	  to	  
sensitive	  information,	  public	  order	  policies	  like	  curfews,	  if	  nothing	  more	  drastic.	  They	  may	  also	  
need	   to	   establish	   in	   advance	   who	   would	   be	   responsible	   for	   evaluating	   and	   responding	   to	  
different	  kinds	  of	  potential	  urgent	  needs,	  and	  develop	  coping	  routines	  and	  mechanisms.	  Such	  
pre-­‐emptive	  approaches	  to	  uncertainty	  are	  often	  grouped	  under	  the	  headings	  of	   ‘contingency	  
planning’	  or	  ‘emergency	  preparedness.’	  
	  
Earlier,	  I	  suggested	  that,	  all	  else	  being	  equal,	  the	  lower	  the	  risk	  of	  emergency,	  the	   less	  
reason	  one	  has	  to	  bother	  with	  it.	  Could	  we	  not	  argue	  that	  second-­‐order	  risks	  are	  too	  hazy	  and	  
remote	  ever	  to	  warrant	  special	  attention?	  As	  I	  tried	  to	  show	  in	  my	  discussion	  of	  warfare,	  such	  a	  
general	  conclusion	  would	  seem	  counter-­‐intuitive.	  Although,	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time,	  first-­‐order	  
risks	   of	   emergencies	   may	   be	   unknown	   and	   unascertainable,	   the	   likelihood	   (or	   second-­‐order	  
risks)	   of	   such	   risks	   ever	   coming	   into	   being	   (or	   already	   secretly	   existing)	   may	   be	   somewhat	  
foreseeable	  given	  the	  context.	  Once	  we	  accept	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  it	  becomes	  easier	  to	  see	  
how	   probabilities	   about	   the	   very	   incidence	   of	   risks	   of	   emergencies	  may	   point	   to	   a	   need	   for	  
immediate	   contingency	  planning,	  and	  have	  moral	   implications.	  What	   is	  debatable	  here	   is	  not	  
whether	   so-­‐called	   second-­‐order	   risks	   matter,	   but	   whether	   we	   are	   in	   fact	   dealing	   with	   a	  
                                                
15 Such cases are distinguishable from emergencies characterised by temporally distant, though highly probable 
harm, in which we know that if we do not act now, harm will likely result at a later point. Consider for example the 
case of early Canadian settlers who needed to store food in the summer to be able to survive the winter. In so-called 
meta-emergency cases, it is uncertainty as to the very existence of serious risks that is the operative variable. Note, 
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different,	  or	   ‘meta,’	  kind	  of	  emergency.	  Arguably,	  a	   first-­‐order	  risk	  and	  a	  second-­‐order	   risk	  of	  
the	  incidence	  of	  this	  risk	  are	  merely	  facets	  of	  the	  same	  overall	  risk.	  The	  overall	  risk	  may	  be	  very	  
low	  or	  hazy	  but,	  as	  I	  observed	  earlier,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  partially	  knowable,	  even	  if	  
only	  through	  experience,	  it	  may	  matter	  morally.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  virtual	  certainty,	  a	  mere	  
possibility	  of	  emergency	  may	  be	  balanced	  with	  other	  variables—such	  as	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  harm	  
risked,	   the	   value	   of	   the	   activity	   exposing	   one	   to	   the	   risk,	   and	   the	   burdens	   of	   prevention—to	  
assess	   the	   reasonableness	   of	   prevention.	   Therefore,	   so-­‐called	   second-­‐order	   risks	   of	  
emergencies	   can	  also	   contribute	   to	   shaping	   the	   landscape	  of	   reasons	   for	  action	  applicable	   to	  
emergency	   responders	   (including	   counter-­‐emergency	   planners)	   and,	   in	   the	   same	   breath,	   the	  
morally	  justified	  courses	  of	  action	  available	  to	  them.	  	  
	  
(2)	   The	  value	  of	  risky	  behaviour	  
	  
Some	  courses	  of	  action	  are	  clearly	  better	  or	  worse	  than	  others.	  Contrast	  the	  declaration	  of	  an	  
unjust	   war	   of	   aggression	   with	   an	   innocent	   state’s	   wholly	   proportionate	   and	   necessary	   self-­‐
defensive	   response	   to	   a	   threat	   or,	   perhaps	   even	   more	   revealing,	   with	   a	   humanitarian	  
intervention	   aimed	   at	   rescuing	   a	   foreign	  minority	   group	   from	   genocide.	   In	   fact,	   activities	   are	  
sometimes	  so	  valuable	  that	  the	  value	  of	  engaging	  in	  them	  outweighs	  associated	  risks.	  The	  risks	  
incurred	  while	   driving	   at	   140km/h	   through	   a	   100km/h	   zone	  may	   not	   be	   outweighed	   by	   the	  
value	  of	  arriving	  at	  a	  party	  on	  time,	  but	  they	  may	  well	  be	  by	  that	  of	  getting	  one’s	  pregnant	  wife	  
in	  painful	  labour	  to	  the	  maternity	  ward	  in	  due	  course.	  Accordingly,	  the	  value	  of	  a	  risky	  activity	  
may	   influence	  which	   associated	   risks,	   including	   risks	   of	   emergencies,	   ought	   to	   be	   proactively	  
avoided	  and	  which	  may	  reasonably	  be	  discounted.	  	  
	  
The	  value	  of	  an	  activity	  does	  not	  necessarily	  depend	  on	   the	  good	  consequences	  of	   its	  
performance.	  Risk	  taking	  may	  itself	  form	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  an	  activity	  worth	  pursuing.	  Just	  as	  
virtually	  any	  human	  activity	   involves	   some	   risk,	   intrinsically	   valuable	   risk-­‐taking	   is	  a	  pervasive	  
feature	   of	   human	   life.	   Think,	   for	   example,	   of	   the	   value	   of	   love	   affairs,	   business	   ventures,	  
extreme	  sports	  or,	  in	  the	  international	  realm,	  the	  value	  of	  standing	  up	  for	  a	  friendly	  nation	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  adversity.	  Many	  such	  activities	  have	  their	  intrinsic	  value	  enhanced	  by	  their	  inherent	  
riskiness.	   Their	   riskiness	   counts	   against	   them	   consequentially,	   but	   in	   favour	   of	   them	   non-­‐
consequentially.	  	  
	  
Of	  course,	  I	  am	  not	  hereby	  denying	  that	  riskiness	  may	  also	  count	  against	  an	  activity	  non-­‐
consequentially	   (i.e.	   irrespective	  of	  deleterious	   consequences).	  Criminally	  prohibited	   inchoate	  
wrongs,	  such	  as	  attempted	  arson	  or	  murder,	  or	  conspiracies,	  reflect	  this	  fact,	  and	  there	  is	  little	  
doubt	   that	   the	   moral	   position	   of	   perpetrators	   may	   be	   affected	   accordingly.16	   International	  
inchoate	  wrongs,	  such	  as	  attempted	  aggressions,	   fall	   in	  the	  same	  category.	  My	  aim	  here	   is	   to	  
                                                
16 As noted by Suzanne Uniacke (1994, 83-84), “in the case of a hijacker holding hostages who kills in self-defence 
in a shoot-out with police, it very clearly makes a difference to the normative background that the hijacker has 
foreseeably and wrongfully created the circumstances in which he is endangered.” 
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emphasize	  that	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  (and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  intrinsic	  disvalue)	  of	  some	  risks	  is	  an	  
oft-­‐neglected	   second-­‐order	   factor	   in	  practical	   thinking	  about	  emergencies—a	   factor	   that	  may	  
have	   significant	   ramifications	   for	   the	   reasonableness	   of	   different	   ways	   of	   planning	   for	   and	  
responding	  to	  them.	  
	  
Now,	   it	   is	  noteworthy	   that	   the	   (positive)	   value	   to	  be	  derived	   from	   risk-­‐taking	  on	  both	  
consequential	  and	  intrinsic	  accounts	  might	  only	  justify	  disregarding	  risks	  beyond	  some	  minimal	  
level	   of	   care	   and	   restraint.	   A	   purported	   war	   hero	   ought	   to	   use	   appropriate	   and	   reliable	  
equipment,	  and	  ensure	  levels	  of	  fitness	  and	  skill	  sufficient	  to	  allow	  her	  to	  carry	  out	  her	  heroic	  
acts.	  A	  state-­‐government	  ought	  to	  do	  at	   least	  some	  basic	  risk	  assessment	  before	  standing	  up	  
for	   another	   nation	   in	   a	   way	   that	   could	   trigger	   a	   bloody	   international	   conflict	   that	   would	  
significantly	  harm	  its	  members.	  Such	  minimal	  thresholds	  of	  care	  pertain	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  value	  
to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   represent	   a	   balance	   between	   valuable	   and	   non-­‐valuable	   aspects	   of	  
activities—risks,	   consequences,	   and	   others—in	   a	   way	   that	   makes	   the	   realisation	   of	   value	  
possible	  through	  the	  activity.	  The	  tension	  inherent	  in	  these	  thresholds	  comes	  out	  perhaps	  most	  
clearly	  in	  cases	  of	  valuable	  activities	  for	  which	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  any	  amount	  of	  precaution	  
could	   even	   minimally	   bring	   the	   inherent	   risks	   of	   emergencies	   under	   control.	   An	   incurable	  
coronary	  patient,	  who	  also	  happens	  to	  be	  an	  army	  doctor,	  may	  increase	  her	  life	  expectancy	  by	  
living	   a	   life	   of	   contemplation	   and	   quiet	   inactivity.	   However,	   what	   if	   she	   wants	   to	   continue	  
working	  hard	  at	  her	  stressful	  career	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  her	  country	  and	  fellow	  soldiers,	  even	  at	  
the	  risk	  of	  a	  sudden	  and	  fatal	  heart	  attack?	  What	  about	  the	  members	  of	  a	  persecuted	  minority	  
group	  who	   insist	   on	   going	   out	   in	   the	   open	   to	  work,	   shop	   and,	   perhaps	   also,	   try	   to	   influence	  
general	  public	  opinion,	  despite	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  dangerously	  racist	  and	  militarized	  majority?	  
	  
In	  both	  cases,	  it	  may	  be	  reasonable	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  more	  dangerous	  path,	  despite	  
the	  deep	  loss	  of	  control	  over	  related	  risks	  that	  such	  a	  decision	  would	  entail.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  
coronary	  patient,	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  answer,	  and	  her	  options	  may	  well	  be	  incommensurable.	  Each	  
may	  have	  its	  costs	  and	  benefits	  both	  consequentially	  and	  intrinsically	  speaking,	  resulting	  in	  two	  
very	   different,	   yet	   rationally	   undefeated,	   life	   paths.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   minority	   group	  
members	  exposing	   themselves	   to	   the	  dangerously	   racist	  majority,	  prudence	  may	   recommend	  
restraint.	  However,	  many	  may	  also	  share	  Tom	  Sorell’s	  intuition	  that	  the	  risks	  of	  emergencies	  at	  
issue	  are	   risks	   for	  which	   the	   relevant	   “preventive	   treatment	   is	  whatever	   cures	   racism,	   rather	  
than	  avoiding	  action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  [those	  who	  may	  be	  victims	  of	  it]”	  (Sorell	  2002,	  24).17	  Since	  it	  
is	   unlikely	   that	   individual	  minority	   group	  members	  would	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   cure	   racism	  by	  
themselves,	  could	  they	  not	  reasonably	  disregard	  related	  risks	  and	  continue	  with	  their	  activities	  
in	   the	   morally	   tainted	   environment?	   Some	   may	   anticipate	   the	   prudent	   mother’s	   objection,	  
imploring	   her	   daughter	   to	   avoid	   all	   contacts	   with	   the	   oppressive	   majority	   if	   she	   has	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  do	  so,	  perhaps	  adding	  that	  if	  she	  goes	  ahead	  and	  gets	  into	  trouble,	  she	  will	  have	  
courted	  it.	  This	  is	  where	  the	  question	  of	  value	  comes	  into	  play.	  One	  way	  of	  rationalizing	  Sorell’s	  
intuition	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  mother’s	  objection	  is	  to	  posit	  that	  the	  value	  of	  being	  able	  to	  go	  out	  
                                                
17 This intuition applies to a much broader array of daily situations, such as threats of terrorism for air travelers or 
risks of rape for women who interact with men. Should airplane users stop flying, and women seek to seclude 
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in	  the	  open	  freely	  to	  work,	  shop,	  and	  carry	  on	  with	  life	  is	  so	  important	  as	  to	  make	  it	  reasonable	  
to	  discount	  racism-­‐related	  risks.	  Here	  again,	  it	  might	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  incommensurable	  choices	  
for	  those	   involved,	  assuming	  that	  they	   indeed	  have	  safer	  alternatives.	  They	  might	   reasonably	  
choose	  to	  be	  prudent	  and	  avoid	  confrontation,	  or	  be	  courageous,	  affirm	  their	  beliefs,	  and	  face	  
the	   potential	   consequences.	   In	   such	   cases,	   then,	   it	   may	   be	   that	   the	   moral	   salience	   of	  
foreseeable	  risks	  of	  emergencies	  must	  not	  only	  be	  assessed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  consequential	  and	  
intrinsic	   (dis)value.	  The	   reasonableness	  of	   responses	   to	   such	   risks	  may	  also	  need	   to	   take	   into	  
account	   the	   value	   for	   potential	   emergency	   responders	   of	   deciding	   for	   themselves	   how	   to	  
respond.	  	  
	  
At	   this	   point,	   it	   bears	   emphasizing	   that	   unlike	   the	   minority	   group	   members	   taken	  
individually,	  their	  political	  leadership	  or	  the	  government	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  they	  reside	  may	  
be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   do	   something	   about	   the	   occurrence	   of	   the	   unwelcome	   incommensurable	  
dilemmas	  they	  face.	  When	  this	   is	   the	  case,	   they	  may	  have	  a	  correspondingly	  strong	  reason,	   if	  
not	   a	   duty,	   to	   do	   so.	   Other	   states	   may	   also	   have	   strong	   reasons	   to	   demand	   change	   and,	  
sometimes,	   even	   to	   intervene	   in	  more	   direct	   ways.	   Thus,	   the	   preventability	   of	   emergencies,	  
assessed	   in	   light	  of	   the	  burdens	  associated	  with	   it,	   also	   seems	  to	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	   to	  how	  
emergencies	   should	   feature	   in	  our	  practical	   thinking	  and	   behaviour,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   that	  of	  our	  
governments.	  	  
	  
(3)	   Burden	  of	  emergency	  prevention	  and	  emergency	  preventability	  
	  
The	  relevance	  of	   foreseeability	  to	  the	  moral	  salience	  of	  emergencies	  depends	   largely	  on	  their	  
preventability,	  because	  foreseeability	  is	  a	  precondition	  for	  purported	  harm	  prevention	  and,	  as	  
such,	   loses	  much	  of	   its	  significance	  when	  prevention	   is	  impossible.	  To	  put	  the	  matter	  crudely,	  
what	  is	  unavoidable	  remains	  unavoidable	  whether	  it	  is	  foreseeable	  or	  not.	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  
preventability	   of	   an	   emergency	   is	   rarely	   an	   all-­‐or-­‐nothing	   issue.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   often	   possible	   to	  
inquire	  whether	  one	  should	  try	  to	  take	  preventive	  action,	  or	  if	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  refrain	  
from	  doing	  so.	  We	  have	  seen	  that,	  generally	  speaking,	  considerations	  of	  harm	  seriousness,	  risk,	  
and	  value	  of	  emergency	  exposure	  are	  relevant	  to	  such	  assessments.	  Yet,	  the	  picture	  would	  not	  
be	  complete	  without	  adding	  that	  emergency	  prevention	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  burdensome	  and	  
costly,	  and	  that	  this	  feature	  also	  has	  a	  direct	  bearing	  on	  its	  reasonableness.	  
	  
	   One	  way	   of	   framing	   the	   issue	  might	   be	   to	   say	   that,	   all	   else	   being	   equal,	   the	  more	   a	  
foreseeable	  emergency	  is	  preventable,	  the	  less	  reasonable	  it	   is	  to	  carry	  on	  without	  seeking	  to	  
prevent	   or	   minimize	   it	   (and	   vice-­‐versa).	   This	   rule	   of	   thumb	   warrants	   some	   important	  
qualifications.	   	   First,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   precautions	   that	   would	   be	   necessary	   to	   prevent	   the	  
emergency	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  According	  to	  Tom	  Sorell,	  one	  should	  consider	  whether	  
the	   requisite	   precautions	   would	   be	   “morally	   harmless	   and	   undaunting.”18	   This	   formulation,	  
                                                
18 Sorell ‘Morality and Emergency’ (n 28) 23. 
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perhaps	  too	   lacking	   in	  nuance,	  begs	  for	  an	  explanation	  that	  Sorell	  does	  not	  explicitly	  provide.	  
Presumably,	   what	   he	   has	   in	   mind	   is	   that	   if	   the	   burden	   or	   cost	   of	   emergency	   prevention	   is	  
onerous,	  it	  may	  entail	  unreasonable	  trade-­‐offs.	  For	  example,	   if	  steps	  necessary	  for	  emergency	  
avoidance	  are	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  more	  harmful	  than	  the	  harm	  to	  be	  avoided,	  and	  more	  risky	  
than	   the	   risks	   already	   incurred,	   the	   case	   for	   prevention	  will	   likely	   be	   defeated.	   Consider	   the	  
case	  of	  soldiers	   in	  the	  field	  who	  would	  need	  to	  kill	   their	  prisoners	  of	  war	  to	  eliminate	   limited	  
risks	  of	  mutiny,	  or	  the	  controversial	  example	  of	  resort	  to	  torture	  as—allegedly—the	  only	  means	  
of	  ascertaining	  some	  remote	  risks	  of	  emergency.	  Consider	  also	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  amount	  
of	   scarce	   resources	   that	  would	   need	   to	   be	   diverted	   to	   prevent	   a	   localised	   emergency	  would	  
endanger	   a	   larger	   segment	   of	   population	   even	  more	   seriously.	   The	   complexity	   of	   preventive	  
measures,	   their	  chance	  of	  success,	   their	  side-­‐effects,	   their	  costs	  to	  the	  actor,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
related	   situation-­‐specific	   factors	  may	   further	   compound	   the	   equation,	  weighing	   either	   for	   or	  
against	  prevention.	  	  
	  
	   Given	  these	  intricacies,	  it	  helps	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  degrees	  of	  preventability.	  One	  may	  
conceive	   of	   situations	   in	  which	   harmless	   and	   relatively	   straightforward	   preventive	  measures	  
could	   significantly	   reduce	   the	   probabilities	   of	   emergencies	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   harm	   risked.	  
However,	  within	  the	  same	  parameters,	  measures	  that	  would	  virtually	  eradicate	  those	  risks	  may	  
require	   excessively	   onerous	   trade-­‐offs.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   taking	   preventive	   steps	  with	   a	  
view	   to	   mitigating	   emergencies,	   short	   of	   preventing	   them	   completely,	   may	   be	   a	   reasonable	  
option.	  For	  example,	  conducting	  thorough	  searches	  of	  every	  commuter	  using	  the	  London	  Tube,	  
as	   well	   as	   their	   every	   piece	   of	   luggage,	   might	   virtually	   eliminate	   risks	   of	   bombings	   inside	  
stations	   and	   trains.	   However,	   such	   an	   approach	   could	   be	   deeply	   invasive	   and	   likely	   cause	  
massive	  congestion,	  if	  not	  cause	  the	  entire	  city	  to	  grind	  to	  a	  halt.	  Sweeping	  schemes	  of	  this	  kind	  
may	   be	   contrasted	   with	   more	   moderate	   and	   practicable	   mitigation	   strategies	   such	   as	   CCTV	  
surveillance,	   regular	   police	   patrols,	   clearly	   marked	   and	   accessible	   emergency	   exits,	   public	  
reminders	  not	   to	   leave	  belongings	  unattended,	   and	   the	   removal	  of	   strategically	   located	   litter	  
bins	  and	  other	  concealed	  spaces.	  As	  an	  author	  fittingly	  remarks,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  “safety	  [i.e.	  the	  
prevention	  of	   risks]	  has	  a	  price,	   in	  terms	  of	   its	   impact	  on	  other	  things	  we	  want	  or	  value,	  and	  
there	  are	  limits	  to	  what	  we	  are	  prepared	  to	  pay”	  (Wolff	  2006,	  415).	  So	  not	  only	  might	  there	  be	  
minimal	   thresholds	   of	   reasonable	   care,	   as	   I	   postulated	   in	   the	   last	   section,	   there	  may	   also	   be	  
maximal	  ones.	   Insofar	  as	  this	   is	  the	  case,	  reasonableness	  will	   likely	   lie	  somewhere	  within	  that	  
range,	   unless	   additional	   considerations	   such	   as	   specific	   duties	   of	   care	   further	   complicate	   the	  
appraisal.	  	  
	  
	   Of	  course,	  the	  possibility	  of	  wholly	  unavoidable	  and	  unmitigable	  emergencies	  cannot	  be	  
excluded.	  However,	  one	  should	  not	  make	  the	  mistake	  of	  confusing	  them	  with	  emergencies	  that	  
are	   inescapable	   by	   specific	   agents,	   but	   preventable	   by	   others.	   In	   2005,	   Mumbai	   endured	   a	  
record	  monsoon	  season	  that	  saw	  almost	  a	  litre	  of	  rainfall	  within	  one	  day.	  More	  than	  a	  thousand	  
people	  were	   estimated	   killed,	   and,	   as	   is	   often	   the	   case,	   the	   poor	  were	   hardest	   hit,	  with	   the	  
highest	   concentration	   of	   deaths	   found	   in	   the	   city’s	   slums.	   Could	   slum	   dwellers	   not	   have	  
minimized	   the	   devastating	   impact	   of	   the	  monsoon,	   especially	   since	   it	   is	   a	   predictable	   yearly	  
occurrence	   (albeit	   usually	   in	   a	  weaker	   form)?	   It	   is	   possible	   that,	   at	   a	   rudimentary	   level,	   they	  
could	  have	  better	  prepared	  themselves	  and	  their	  immediate	  environment.	  However,	  given	  their	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negligible	   financial	  means	   and	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   expertise	   and	  material	   resources,	   it	   is	   nearly	  
certain	   that	   they	  were	   unable	   to	   do	   anything	   significant	   on	   their	   own,	   including	   relocating.	  
Thus,	  for	  scores	  of	  urban	  poor,	  a	  flood	  emergency	  could	  well	  seem	  unavoidable.	  Yet,	  just	  like	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  member	  of	  a	  minority	  group	  confronting	  endemic	  racism,	  this	  is	  a	  perspectival	  
observation	  which	  does	  not	  imply	  that,	  all	  things	  considered,	  nothing	  could	  be	  done	  to	  prevent	  
the	  emergency.	  	  
	  
The	  Indian	  government	  at	  all	  levels,	  in	  tandem	  with	  local	  corporations	  and	  NGOs,	  could	  
contribute	  to	  the	  design	  and	  construction	  of	  infrastructures	  capable	  of	  absorbing	  and	  draining	  
heavier	  rainfalls.	  If	  the	  Indian	  state	  was	  too	  poor	  to	  build	  sufficiently	  effective	  infrastructures,	  
other	  states,	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  corporations	  and	  individuals,	  were	  undoubtedly	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
aid	   in	   providing	   the	   necessary	   funds,	   resources,	   expertise,	   and	   skills.	   When	   individuals,	  
collectivities,	  and	  institutions	  face	  emergencies	  that	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  prevent	  on	  their	  own,	  it	  
is	  often	   the	  case	   that	  third	  parties	  may	  assist	   in	  preventing	  or	  minimizing	   risks.	  The	  question	  
then	  becomes	  who	  is	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  act	  preventively	  and	  who,	  if	  anybody,	  should	  bear	  
the	  burden,	  or	  part	  of	  the	  burden,	  of	  doing	  so.19	  Unsurprisingly,	  this	  line	  of	  questioning	  tends	  to	  
loom	   large	   in	   international	  debates	  about	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  United-­‐Nations-­‐led	  economic	  and	  
military	   operations,	   as	   well	   as	   more	   state-­‐driven	   humanitarian	   interventions	   aimed	   at	   pre-­‐
empting	  bloody	  conflicts	  in	  foreign	  lands.	  
	  
	   What	  about	  situations	  in	  which	  harm	  cannot	  realistically	  be	  avoided	  at	  all?20	  Such	  cases	  
warrant	   independent	   treatment.	   As	   I	   already	   suggested	   when	   discussing	   the	   concept	   of	  
emergency,	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  conditional	  upon	  the	  existence	  of	  harm	  that	  can	  
be	  averted	  or	  significantly	  minimized.	  This	  relation	  holds	  true	  because	  emergency	  is	  a	  category	  
of	   practical	   thought	   and,	   as	   such,	   presupposes	   sufficiency	   of	   means	   to	   address	   it.	   Why?	   As	  
Anthony	  Kenny	   remarked	  many	  years	  ago,	   “the	  purpose	  of	  practical	   reasoning	   is	   to	  get	  done	  
what	  we	  want,”	  so	  that	  a	  practical	  category	  presupposes	  a	  reachable	  goal	  (Kenny	  1966,	  73).21	  If	  
no	  realistic	  means	  would	  be	  sufficient	  for	  the	  goal	  to	  be	  achieved,	  the	  situation	  falls	  outside	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  relevant	  practical	  category.	  In	  the	  cases	  that	  concern	  us,	  if	  nothing	  can	  realistically	  
be	  done	   to	  prevent	  or	  minimize	   serious	  harm,	   then	   there	   is	  no	   necessity	   to	   take	  action,	  and	  
thus	  no	  emergency.	  	  
	  
One	   might	   seek	   to	   counter	   this	   point	   by	   appealing	   to	   hypothetical	   examples	   of	  
unavoidable	  and	  unmitigable	  harm,	  like	  that	  of	  a	  giant	  asteroid	  about	  to	  collide	  with	  Earth.	  Do	  
we	   not	   envisage	   such	   in	   extremis	   threats	   of	   (ex	   hypothesi)	   unavoidable	   harm	   as	   generalised	  
                                                
19 On task-efficacy as grounding a duty to govern (and, perhaps, a duty of assistance more generally), see Green 
(2007). 
20 I resort to the admittedly vague and general concept of ‘realistically unavoidable harm’ to prevent any distracting 
digression into metaphysical debates about ‘can’ and ‘could.’  
 
21 Of course, ‘what we want’ should be read to refer to what we rationally want, as opposed to raw desire. 
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emergencies?	  In	  my	  view,	  conflicting	  intuitions	  may	  come	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  we	  imagine	  
such	  extreme	  situations,	  we	  also	  tend	  to	  envision	  the	  social	  chaos	  that	  would	  likely	  accompany	  
them.	   Amidst	   pre-­‐Armageddon	   civil	   disorder,	   there	   might	   be	   countless	   threats	   of	   avoidable	  
harm	   calling	   for	   urgent	   reactions,	   amounting	   to	   a	   general	   state	   of	   emergency.	   Yet,	   the	  
imminent	   and	   all-­‐encompassing	   destruction	   to	   be	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   giant	   asteroids	   does	  
not	  per	  se	  constitute	  an	  emergency.	  In	  a	  counterfactual	  world	  in	  which	  such	  pervasive	  harm	  is	  
avoidable	   or	   mitigable,	   its	   threat	   would	   no	   doubt	   constitute	   one.	   However,	   where	   it	   is	  
realistically	  unavoidable,	  a	  would-­‐be	  emergency	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  tragedy.	  In	  fact,	  one	  does	  not	  
need	   to	   think	   of	   such	   far-­‐fetched	   examples	   to	   appreciate	   the	   tragic	   nature	   of	   inescapable	  
threats	  of	  unavoidable	  harm.	  A	  tragedy	  arises	  whenever	  serious	  harm	  becomes	  unpreventable,	  
as	  assessed	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  agents	  who	  cannot	  realistically	  do	  anything	  about	  it.	  Large	  
earthquake	  scenarios	   involving	  rescuers	  too	  far-­‐off	   to	  reach	  victims	   in	  time	  and	  a	  shortage	  of	  
effective	  means	   of	   rescue,	   cases	   of	   slum	  dwellers	   trapped	   in	   flooding	   rooms	  with	   no	   help	   in	  
sight,	   instances	   of	   non-­‐deflectable	   missiles	   fired	   in	   error,	   are	   perhaps	   even	   more	   vivid	  
illustrations	  due	  to	  their	  prior	  historical	  occurrence	  and	  possible	  recurrence.	  Of	  course,	   this	   is	  
not	  to	  say	  that	   inescapable	  threats	  of	  unavoidable	  harm	  cannot	  constitute	  reasons	  for	  action	  
for	  helpless	  agents.	  However,	  if	  they	  do	  constitute	  reasons,	  these	  reasons	  will	  at	  most	  be	  of	  an	  
expressive	   nature—e.g.	   reasons	   for	   engaging	   in	   futile	   rescue	   attempts	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
symbolically	  demonstrating	  how	  much	  one	  cares,	  reasons	  for	  telling	  others	  one	  last	  time	  what	  
they	  mean	  to	  us,	  reasons	  for	  offering	  to	  sacrifice	  oneself	  first	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  solidarity.	  	  
	  
To	   summarize,	   emergencies	  matter	   at	   a	   basic,	   first-­‐order	   level	   and	   pose	   the	   practical	  
challenges	   they	   do	   because	   of	   the	   potential	   for	   serious	   harm	   that	   they	   represent	   and	   the	  
urgency	   of	   the	   responses	   needed	   to	   avert	   or	   minimized	   that	   harm.	   The	   contours	   and	  
materialization	   of	   such	   broadly	   defined	   features	  may	   require	   determinations,	  which	   relevant	  
authorities	  may	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  provide	  legitimately.	  Even	  then,	  though,	  the	  justification	  of	  
responses	   to	   emergencies	   will	   frequently	   also	   depend	   on	   second-­‐order	   considerations,	  
including	  how	  foreseeable,	  valuable,	  and	  preventable	  these	  emergencies	  were	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
	  
C	   SOME	  CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  ABOUT	  PUBLIC	  EMERGENCIES	  	  
	  
Other	   features	   of	   emergencies	   may	   also	   be	   morally	   salient,	   and	   affect	   how	   they	   may	   be	  
addressed.	   I	   want	   to	   conclude	   by	   saying	   a	   few	  words	   about	   one	   such	   feature—namely,	   the	  
public	  dimension	  that	  many	  emergencies	  considered	  in	  this	  chapter	  happen	  to	  share.	  Bernard	  
Williams	   once	   wrote	   that	   the	   “first	   political	   question”	   is	   “the	   securing	   of	   order,	   protection,	  
safety,	   trust,	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  cooperation,”	  and	  that	  the	  modern	  state	  presents	   itself	  as	  
its	   solution	   (Williams	   2005,	   3).	   State-­‐governments,	   it	   is	   widely	   believed,	   exist	   primarily	   to	  
provide	  these	  public	  goods.	  Depending	  on	  whom	  one	  asks,	   the	   list	   is	  sometimes	  more	  or	   less	  
extended	   to	   also	   include	   a	   plethora	   of	   other	   goods	   and	   values	   that	  markets	   are	   thought	   ill-­‐
suited	  to	  fulfil.	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere	  that	  public	  emergencies	  are	  emergencies	  that	  interfere,	  
or	  threaten	  to	   interfere,	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods—with	   international	  and	  civil	  wars	  
perhaps	  constituting	  paradigmatic	  examples	  (Tanguay-­‐Renaud	  2009).	  Thus,	  public	  emergencies	  
are	   the	   emergencies	   towards	   which	   state-­‐governments	   should	   first	   and	   foremost	   turn	   their	  
attention,	  and	  which	  they	  should	  primarily	  seek	  to	  prevent.	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   However,	  in	  striving	  to	  address	  such	  emergencies,	  governments	  must	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  
become	  part	  of	  the	  problems	  they	  exist	  to	  solve.	  In	  Williams’s	  broadly	  worded	  language,	  they	  
must	   not	   resort	   to	   terror.	   So,	   while	   they	   may	   need	   to	   resort	   to	   coercion	   to	   achieve	   their	  
legitimate	   ends,	   they	   should	   always	   strive	   to	   do	   so	   consistently	   with	   the	   harm	   principle,	   or	  
some	   similar	   principle	   of	   toleration.	   That	   is,	   their	   invasions	   of	   personal	   autonomy	   for	   the	  
suppression	  of	  public	  emergencies	  (themselves	  morally	  costly)	  should	  not	  be	  disproportionate	  
to	  the	  moral	  gains	  on	  offer.	  Since	  governments	  tend	  to	  have	  significant	  de	  facto	  authority	  over	  
the	   governed	   and	   to	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   modify	   their	   normative	   position	   in	   radical	   ways	   by	  
altering	  their	  legal	  duties,	  rights,	  and	  permissions,	  they	  must	  also	  strive	  to	  do	  so	  in	  accordance	  
with	   the	   ideal	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   In	   other	  words,	   governments	  must	   strive	   to	   exercise	   their	  
authority	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  clear,	  prospective,	  open,	  stable,	  consistent,	  and	  general,	  so	  that	  the	  
governed	  are	  able	   to	   conduct	   their	   lives	   in	  ways	   that	  avoid	   the	   stigma	  and	  disruption	   of	   the	  
adverse	  consequences	   that	   can	   follow	   from	   the	   breach	  of	  governmental	   rules	  and	  directives.	  
These	   moral	   constraints	   are	   additional	   to	   the	   ones	   considered	   earlier.	   They	   apply	   to	   state-­‐
governments	  in	  particular,	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  social	  power,	  authority,	  and	  the	  means	  they	  employ	  
to	  discharge	  their	  legitimate	  functions.	  	  
	  
	   Admittedly,	   these	   additional	   constraints	   are	   not	   absolute.	   For	   example,	   governments	  
may	   sometimes	  be	   justified	   in	   leaving	  behind	   the	   rule	  of	   law	   for	   the	   sake	  of	  other,	  weightier	  
values	   that	   can	   only	   be	   vindicated	   through	  more	   flexible	  means.	   Yet,	   if	   governments	   are	   to	  
avoid	   becoming	   part	   of	   the	   central	   problems	   they	   exist	   to	   solve,	   such	   decisions	  must	   not	   be	  
taken	   lightly.	   Thus,	   although	   some	   public	   emergencies	   will	   be	   unpredictable	   in	   their	   timing,	  
such	  unpredictability	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  rules	  that	  are	  clear,	  prospective,	  etc.,	  cannot	  be	  ready	  
for	   when	   these	   emergencies	   occur.	   Countless	   jurisdictions	   possess	   a	  myriad	   of	   ‘stand-­‐by’	   or	  
‘backup’	  emergency	  laws	  waiting	  to	  be	  used	  to	  deal	  with	  public	  emergencies.22	  These	  laws	  are	  
not	  applicable	  in	  normal	  times	  because	  the	  factual	  situations	  to	  which	  they	  relate	  do	  not	  exist,	  
but	  they	  remain	  available	  on	  the	  statute	  books.	  Similarly,	  in	  most	  legal	  systems,	  swift	  legislative	  
action	  often	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  introduce	  ad	  hoc	  measures	  that	  accord	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  to	  
deal	   with	   unforeseen	   emergencies	   that	   are	   not	   covered	   by	   stand-­‐by	   legislation.	   These	  
institutional	  facts	  may	  seem	  somewhat	  banal,	  but	  they	  are	  often	  ignored	  in	  discussions	  of	  the	  
particular	   challenges	   posed	   by	   public	   emergencies	   and	   appropriate	   means	   of	   prevention.	   In	  
fact,	   even	  when	  ad	   hoc	   legislation	   is	   impossible,	   governments	   are	   still	   often	   in	   a	   position	   to	  
provide	  general	  notice	  to	  the	  governed	  that	  their	  normative	  position	  is	  about	  to	  be	  changed	  in	  
unforeseen	  ways,	  by	  declaring	  a	  ‘state	  of	  emergency’	  publicly.	  Thus,	  they	  may	  at	  least	  be	  able	  
to	  comply	  partially	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
	  
                                                
22 See e.g. Emergencies Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.) (Canada), online:  <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-
4.5.pdf>. 
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   Although	   I	   can	   only	   discuss	   cursorily	   such	   additional	   considerations	   tied	   to	   public	  
emergencies,	   I	   mention	   them	   in	   conclusion	   to	   contextualize	   my	   earlier	   discussion	   of	   basic	  
challenges	  posed	  by	  emergencies.	  In	  other	  words,	  more	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  if	  a	  complete	  
picture	  of	  the	  governance	  challenges	  posed	  by	  public	  emergencies	  is	  to	  be	  provided.	  	  
	  
	   Notice	   also	   that	   most	   of	   my	   discussion	   in	   this	   chapter	   has	   been	   about	   emergency	  
justifications,	   as	   opposed	   to	   excuses	   that	   emergencies	   may	   provide	   for	   impermissible	  
behaviour.	  Yet,	  as	  I	  remarked	  before,	  many	  emergencies	  demand	  that	  those	  who	  address	  them	  
assess	   the	   parameters	   of	   their	   predicament	   hastily.	   Many	   emergencies	   also	   trigger	   strong	  
emotions.	  Thus,	  emergency	  responders’	  interpretation	  of	  the	  situations	  they	  are	  facing	  can	  at	  
times	   be	   distorted,	   and	   lead	   to	   unjustified	   wrongful	   responses	   on	   their	   part.	   Yet,	   if	   their	  
unjustified	   wrongful	   responses	   are	   understandable	   in	   the	   circumstances,	   should	   they	   be	  
excused	   in	  ways	   that	   allow	   them	  to	   avoid	   blame	   and	   cognate	   consequences?	   This	   is	   not	   the	  
place	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   standards	   of	   excuses.	   Note,	   however,	   that	   while	   it	   is	   often	  
acknowledged	   that	   individual	   emergency	   responders	   may	   be	   entitled	   to	   emergency-­‐related	  
excuses,	   many	   theorists	   resist	   the	   ascription	   of	   such	   excuses	   to	   the	   state.23	   One	   important	  
ground	   for	   this	   reluctance	   is	   the	   thought	   that	   excusing	   states	   for	   wrongs	   perpetrated	   in	  
emergencies	   may	   send	   the	   wrong	   message,	   and	   invite	   an	   erroneous	   perception	   amongst	  
governmental	   officials	   that	   no	  more	   is	   demanded	  of	   them	   in	   such	   situations.	  Given	   the	   high	  
stakes	  typically	  involved	  in	  public	  emergencies	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  moral	  constraints	  like	  the	  
ones	  just	  discussed,	  such	  “emergency	  thinking”	  slippages	  are	  not	  to	  be	  encouraged.	  This	  is	  not	  
to	   say,	   of	   course,	   that	   state-­‐governments	  may	   never	   be	   excused.	   Yet,	   it	   is	   at	   least	   a	   strong	  
reason	   to	   think	   that	   appropriate	   standards	   for	   state	   excuses	   for	   wrongdoing	   in	   emergencies	  
may	   be	   significantly	   higher	   than	   those	   applicable	   to	   ordinary	   individuals.	   This,	   I	   think,	   is	   the	  
grain	  of	  truth	  in	  the	  assertions	  of	  those	  who	  would	  want	  us	  to	  restrict	  “emergency	  thinking”	  to	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